Editing Conspiracy BBS Archive/cia info (section)

===CUBA:  THE BAY OF PIGS===


As surely as the successful operation in Guatemala was an
example of how to conduct a covert action, the debacle in Cuba
was a primary example of what not to do.  The disaster at the Bay
of Pigs in Cuba seriously altered the perception of the CIA's
ability to plan and conduct covert paramilitary operations. 
Indeed, as Satish Kumar pointed out in his book The CIA in the
Third World:  A Study in Crypto-Diplomacy, "it is certain that
the Cuban operation cast serious doubts as to the efficacy of
large-scale para-military operations as an instrument of covert
action."  Says Harry Rositzke, a former CIA operative, 

Para-military operations are the "noisiest" of all
covert actions.  When they fail, they become public
fiascos, and no official denials are plausible. 
The history of American para-military operations as
an element of America's containment policy is one
of almost uniform failure.


Such was the case with the ill-fated Bay of Pigs operation in
Cuba.
     
The idea of a Soviet-oriented communist dictatorship a mere
ninety miles from the United States was a grave concern for U.S.
leaders in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  Neither President
Eisenhower nor his predecessor John Fitzgerald Kennedy were
pleased to have a neighbor with such undemocratic ideals.  As
early as 1959, the CIA had advocated the elimination of Castro,
and as has already been pointed out, the Agency began an
operation ([[Operation Mongoose]]) aimed at accomplishing just that. 
     
The alternative of initiating guerilla operations against
Castro had been abandoned by the CIA in 1960.  Instead,
Eisenhower set-up a CIA-run program for training hundreds of
highly motivated anti-Castro Cuban refugees in the arts of
guerilla combat, planning to possibly use the force to overthrow
the Castro government.  Vice President Richard Nixon was a strong
supporter of a program to topple the Castro regime, and
Eisenhower, upon the advice of the NSC Subcommittee responsible
for reviewing covert action schemes, approved the paramilitary
training project as a contingency plan, leaving the decision of
whether or not to execute it up to the incoming Kennedy
administration.  
     
President Kennedy decided to go ahead with the plan after
taking office.  Senate Foreign Relations Chairman William
Fulbright, upon learning of plans for the proposed invasion, sent
a memorandum to the White House that said that if American forces
were drawn into the battle in Cuba,

We would have undone the work of thirty years in
trying to live down earlier interventions...To give
this activity even covert support is of a piece
with the hypocrisy and cynicism for which the
United States is constantly denouncing the Soviet
Union in the United Nations and elsewhere.  This
point will not be lost on the rest of the world nor
our own consciences.  And remember always, the
Castro regime is a thorn in the side but not a
dagger in the heart.



The Senator's views were no doubt on Kennedy's mind when he
later declined to commit American troops after the invasion
began to fall apart.
     
The CIA trained some 1400 Cuban emigres for action
against Castro.  Some of the Cubans were trained as ground
forces and the remainder as pilots.  It was eventually
decided that the guerilla brigade would make an amphibious
landing in the Bay of Pigs.  Air support for the operation
was to be supplied for the operation by emigre pilots flying
in American B-26s made up to look like Cuban Air Force
planes.  This would help create the illusion that Castro's
own men were rebelling against him.  On April 15, 1961, eight
U.S.-made planes conducted air strikes against three Cuban
air bases with the intention of destroying the Cuban  Air
Force on the ground.  These attempts proved to be
unsuccessful.  The events that followed spelled disaster for
the Cuban guerrillas and the CIA.
     
When the invasion force landed at the Bay of Pigs, it
met considerably more resistance than had been expected. 
Despite broadcasts by the CIA run Radio Swan, the Cuban
militia and citizens were not incited to rebel against the
Castro regime as the CIA had estimated.  Instead, the Cuban
forces fought valiantly against the exile force.  The Castro
Air Force, which had not been completely destroyed, began to
inflict severe damages on both the rebel air and ground
forces. For all intents and purposes, the invasion was over
almost as quickly as it had begun, with Castro's forces
easily quashing the rebellion.
     
Fatal to the operation were a number of bad breaks. 
U.S. air cover that was to be provided for one hour at the
onset of the invasion never materialized because of a
miscommunication between the rebels and the U.S. Air Force. 
The rebel Air Force sustained such heavy casualties that CIA
pilots  had to fly missions in a futile attempt to salvage
the operation.  As has already been mentioned, the Cuban
people did not react as had been expected, and without
popular support, the invasion had little chance of success. 
Even before the operation was a confirmed failure, the CIA
cover story began to fall apart and later revelations about
U.S. involvement in the fiasco greatly embarrassed the United
States.
     
The Castro forces took more than eleven-hundred
prisoners during the fighting.  Most of them were traded on
Christmas eve of 1962 to the United States for $10 million in
cash and $53 million in medicines, baby foods, and other
supplies and equipment exempted from the American embargo on
shipments to Cuba.  Of the approximately 1300 guerrillas that
actually had gone ashore, 114 were killed during the three
fatal days of the operation.