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==CHAPTER FIVE== A major requirement of covert operations over the years has been that in the event something goes wrong, the president, as head of state in the U.S., should be able to believably deny any knowledge of the clandestine activity. This concept is known as plausible deniability and it has been a cornerstone in the foundation of presidential decisions to authorize covert operations. The misconception that plausible deniability is a valid method of concealing U.S. involvement in covert activities has led to a number of problems over the years. The doctrine of plausible deniability led to many of the widespread abuses of power that occurred in the CIA before the Intelligence Reform Era in the mid-1970s. It led the agency to believe that CIA officers had a green light to conduct almost any actions they saw fit to reach their goals. McGeorge Bundy, a former Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President's Kennedy and Johnson, has stated: While in principle it has always been the understanding of senior government officials outside the CIA that no covert operations would be undertaken without the explicit approval of "higher authority", there has also been a general expectation within the Agency that it was proper business to generate attractive proposals and to stretch them, in operation, to the furthest limit of any authorization actually received. It is easy to see how this misperception on the part of the CIA developed. A president, hoping to pursue his goals, would communicate his desire for a sensitive operation indirectly, thereby creating sort of a "blank check". CIA officers, intending to carry out the wishes of the president, would then set about furthering the expressed desires of the Commander in Chief. However, instead of informing the president of the progress of the covert planning, the officers would be tempted to keep him unaware of it, thereby enabling him to "plausibly deny" any knowledge of the scheme. Darrel Garwood, the author of a comprehensive work on CIA activities entitled Under Cover writes, "Plausible deniability" could be regarded as one of the most wretched theories ever invented. Its application...was based on the idea that in an unholy venture a president could be kept so isolated from events that when exposure came he could truthfully emerge as shiningly blameless. In practice, whether he deserved it or not, a president almost always had to take the blame for whatever happened. Also, as the Senate Intelligence Committee pointed out about plausible deniability, "this concept...has been expanded to mask decisions of the President and his senior staff members." A recent example of how problems linked to this concept can occur is the so-called "Iran-Contra Affair" which made the headlines in late 1986 and earlier this year. The fiasco was an embarrassing illustration of the example which was discussed above. Although the CIA itself was not directly implicated in the scandal, Colonel Oliver North and other members of the government were discovered to have been carrying out the aims of the President--by channeling funds from arms sales to Iran to the Contras in Nicaragua-- supposedly without his knowledge. Whether or not President Reagan actually knew about the diversion of funds is unclear, but in any event, top level planners of the operation believed that the President would be able to plausibly deny any knowledge of the diversion of funds. However, because of the intense scrutiny placed upon the operation by the media and Congress, President Reagan was unable to convince them and the country as a whole that he had no knowledge of the diversion. As the president and his men learned the hard way, "inevitably, the truth prevails and policies pursued on the premise that they could be plausibly denied in the end damage America's reputation and the faith of her people in their government". One of the major reasons that the CIA has gone astray over the last forty years is the veritable freedom from any type of control or restriction that it has enjoyed. Though Congress investigated the activities of the Agency in 1975 and subsequently instituted more stringent oversight procedures, the CIA of today is once again an agency that is able to do almost as it pleases. The strictures placed on the CIA by the Ford and Carter Administrations were relaxed in 1981 when Ronald Reagan took office. To understand how the Agency has become so omnipotent since 1947 will require a look back to a time when the Agency really did as it pleased. To get an idea of the characteristics of the men in the Agency during its first three decades, we shall look at a description of CIA case officers. CIA men abroad were called case officers within the organization. As individuals, they were generally efficient, dedicated, highly motivated and incorruptible. The trouble in the CIA was likely to be that, for anything short of the meanest of all-out wars, they were too highly motivated. A severe beating administered to a reluctant informant, or the assassination of a would-be left- wing dictator, could seem trivial to them in the light of their goal of outscoring the nation's potential enemies. And naturally, until one happened, they could not imagine a nationwide furor over actions which to them seemed unimportant. In a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in April, 1971, then DCI Richard Helms said, "The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we too are honorable men, devoted to her service." CIA officials were not the only ones who believed that the CIA could be trusted to carry out the objectives of the United States Government. The Agency had a number of champions in the Congress of the United States as well. Feelings about the sanctity of sensitive information dealt with by the Agency led to wide support for a laissez faire policy in Congress regarding the CIA. For example, Richard Russell, the Democratic Senator from Georgia, once gave the following explanation of why he led the fight against a resolution to provide for closer Congressional surveillance of the CIA. Russell noted that the statement had been made on the floor that the Armed Services subcommittee of which he was a member had not revealed to the country what it had learned about CIA operations. "No, Mr. President," Russell said, "we have not told the country, and I do not propose to tell the country in the future, because if there is anything in the United States which should be held sacred behind the curtain of classified matter, it is information regarding the activities of this agency...It would be better to abolish it out of hand than it would be to adopt a theory that such information should be spread and made available to every member of Congress and to the members of the staff of any committee. With such a powerful man and others like him on its side, it is small wonder that the CIA got away with the things that it did prior to 1975. CIA officers cleverly played upon the fears of Congress to consolidate the power of the Agency. Former CIA director Allen Dulles, speaking before a Congressional committee, warned, Any investigation, whether by a congressional committee or any other body, which results in disclosure of our secret activities and operations or uncovers our personnel, will help a potential enemy just as if the enemy had been able to infiltrate his own agents right into our shop. Such statements led Senators like John Stennis to comment, "If you are going to have an intelligence agency, you have to protect it as such...and shut your eyes some, and take what's coming". �==Appendix I== The following is a partial list of United States Covert action abroad to impose or restore favorable political conditions, 1946-1983. The list was prepared by Tom Gervasi of the Center for Military Research and Analysis in 1984, and it was compiled using information available in the public domain. 1946: GREECE. Restore monarch after overthrow of Metaxas government. Successful. 1946-1955: WEST GERMANY. Average of $6 million annually to support former Nazi intelligence network of General Reinhard Gehlen. Successful. 1948-1968: ITALY. Average of $30 million annually in payments to political and labor leaders to supportanti- Communist candidates in Italian elections. Successful. 1949: GREECE. Military assistance to anti-Communist forces in Greek civil war. Successful. 1949-1953: UKRAINE. Organize and support a Ukrainian resistance movement. Unsuccessful. 1949-1961: BURMA. Support 12,000 Nationalist China troops in Burma under General Li Mi as an incursion force into People's Republic of China. Unsuccessful. 1950-1952: POLAND. Financial and military assistance for Polish Freedom and Independence Movement. Unsuccessful. 1950: ALBANIA. Overthrow government of Enver Hoxha. Unsuccessful. 1951-1954: CHINA. Airdrop guerilla teams into People's Republic of China. Unsuccessful. 1953: IRAN. Overthrow Mossadegh government and install Zahedi. Cost: $10 million. Successful. 1953: PHILLIPINES. Assassination and propaganda campaign to overcome Huk resistance and install government of Ramon Magsaysay. Successful. @Copyright 1984 by the Center for Military Research and Analysis 1953: COSTA RICA. Overthrow government of Jose Figueres. Unsuccessful. 1954: SOUTH VIETNAM. Install government of Ngo Dinh Diem. Successful. 1954: WEST GERMANY. Arrange abduction and discreditation of West German intelligence chief Otto John, and replace with Reinhard Gehlen. Successful. 1954: GUATEMALA. Overthrow government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman and replace with Carlos Castillo Armas. Successful. 1955: CHINA. Assassinate Zhou Enlai en route to Bandung Conference. Unsuccessful. 1956: HUNGARY. Financial and military assistance to organize and support a Hungarian resistance movement, and broad propaganda campaign to encourage it. Unsuccessful. 1956: CUBA. Establish anti-Communist police force, Buro de Represion Actividades Communistas (BRAC) under Batista regime. Successful. 1956: EGYPT. Overthrow Nasser government. Unsuccessful. 1956: SYRIA. Overthrow Ghazzi government. Aborted by Israeli invasion of Egypt. 1956-1957: JORDAN. Average of $750,000 annually in personal payments to King Hussein. According to United States government, payments ceased when disclosed in 1976. 1957: LEBANON. Financial assistance for the election of pro-American candidates to Lebanese Parliament. Successful. 1958: INDONESIA. Financial and military assistance, including B-26 bombers, for revel forces attempting to overthrow Sukarno government. Unsuccessful. 1958-1961: TIBET. Infiltrate Tibetan guerrillas trained in United States to fight Chinese Communists. Unsuccessful. 1959: CAMBODIA. Assassinate Prince Norodum Shianouk. Unsuccessful. 1960: GUATEMALA. Military assistance, including the use of B-26 bombers for government of Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes to defeat rebel forces. Successful. 1960: ANGOLA. Financial and military assistance to rebel forces of Holden Roberto. Inconclusive. 1960: LAOS. Military assistance, including 400 United States Special Forces troops, to deny the Plain of Jars bad Mekong Basin to Pathet Lao. Inconclusive. 1961-1965: LAOS. Average of $300 million annually to recruit and maintain L'Armee Clandestine of 35,000 Hmong and Meo tribesmen and 17,000 Thai mercenaries in support of government of Phoumi Nosavan to resist Pathet Lao. Successful. 1961-1963: CUBA. Assassinate Fidel Castro. Six attempts in this period. Unsuccessful. 1961: CUBA. Train and support invasion force of Cuban exiles to overthrow Castro government, and assist their invasion at the Bay of Pigs. Cost: $62 million. Unsuccessful. 1961: ECUADOR. Overthrow government of Hose Velasco Ibarra. Successful. 1961: CONGO. Precipitate conditions leading to assassination of Patrice Lumumba. Successful. 1961: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. Precipitate conditions leading to assassination of Rafael Trujillo. Successful. 1961-1966: CUBA. Broad sabotage program, including terrorist attacks on coastal targets and bacteriological warfare, in effort to weaken Castro government. Unsuccessful. 1962: THAILAND. Brigade of 5,000 United States Marines to resist threat to Thai government from Pathet Lao. Successful. 1962-1964: BRITISH GUIANA. Organize labor strikes and riots to overthrow government of Cheddi Jagan. Successful. 1962-1964: BRAZIL. Organize campaign of labor strike and propaganda to overthrow government of Joao Goulart. Successful. 1963: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. Overthrow government of Juan Bosch in military coup. Successful. 1963: SOUTH VIETNAM. Precipitate conditions leading to assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem. Successful. 1963: ECUADOR. Overthrow government of Carlos Julio Arosemena. Successful. 1963-1984: EL SALVADOR. Organize ORDEN and ANSESAL domestic intelligence networks under direction of General Jose Alberto Medrano and Colonel Nicolas Carranza, and provide intelligence support and training in surveillance, interrogation and assassination techniques. Successful. 1963-1973: IRAQ. Financial and military assistance for Freedom Party of Mulla Mustafa al Barzani in effort to establish independent Kurdistan. Unsuccessful. 1964: CHILE. $20 million in assistance for Eduardo Frei to defeat Salvador Allende in Chilean elections.Successful. 1964: BRAZIL, GUATEMALA, URUGUAY, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. Provide training in assassination and interrogation techniques for police and intelligence personnel. Inconclusive. 1964: CONGO. Financial and military assistance, including B-26 and T-28 aircraft, and American and exiled Cuban pilots, for Joseph Mobutu and Cyril Adoula, and later for Moise Tshombe in Katanga, to defeat rebel forces loyal to Lumumba. Successful. 1964-1967: SOUTH VIETNAM. Phoenix Program to eliminate Viet Cong political infrastructure through more than 20,000 assassinations. Infiltrated by Viet Cong and only partially successful. 1964-1971: NORTH VIETNAM. Sabotage and ambush missions under Operations Plan 34A by United States Special Forces and Nung tribesmen. Inconclusive. 1965-1971: LAOS. Under Operations Shining Brass and Prairie Fire, sabotage and ambush missions by United States Special Forces personnel and Nung and Meo tribesmen under General Bang Pao. Inconclusive. 1965: THAILAND. Recruit 17,000 mercenaries to support Laotian government of Phoumi Nosavan resisting Pathet Lao. Successful. 1965: PERU. Provide training in assassination and interrogation techniques for Peruvian police and intelligence personnel, similar to training given in Uruguay, Brazil and Dominican Republic, in effort to defeat resistance movement. Unsuccessful. 1965: INDONESIA. Organize campaign of propaganda to overthrow Sukarno government, and precipitate conditions leading to massacre of more than 500,000 members of Indonesian Communist Party, in order to eliminate opposition to new Suharto government. Successful. 1967: BOLIVIA. Assist government in capture of Ernesto Che Guevara. Successful. 1967: GREECE. Overthrow government of George Papandreou and install military government of Colonel George Papadopolous after abdication of King Constantine. Successful. 1967-1971: CAMBODIA. Under Projects Daniel Boone and Salem House, sabotage and ambush missions by United States Special Forces personnel and Meo tribesmen. Inconclusive. 1969-1970: CAMBODIA. Bombing campaign to crush Viet Cong sanctuaries in Cambodia. Unsuccessful. 1970: CAMBODIA. Overthrow government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Successful. 1970-1973: CHILE. Campaign of assassinations, propaganda, labor strikes and demonstrations to overthrow government of Salvador Allende. Cost: $8,400,000. Successful. 1973-1978: AFGHANISTAN. Military and financial assistance to government of Mohammed Duad to resist rise to power of Noor Mohammed Taraki. Unsuccessful. 1975: PORTUGAL. Overthrow government of General Vasco dos Santos Goncalves. Successful. 1975: ANGOLA. Military assistance to forces of Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi to defeat forces of Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) during Angolan civil war, and prevent MPLA from forming new government. Unsuccessful. 1975: AUSTRALIA. Propaganda and political pressure to force dissolution of labor government of Gough Whitlam. Successful. 1976: JAMAICA. Military coup to overthrow government of Michael Manley. Unsuccessful. 1976-1984: ANGOLA. Financial and military assistance to forces of Jonas Savimbi to harass and destabilize Neto and succeeding governments. Inconclusive. 1979: IRAN. Install military government to replace Shah and resist growth of Moslem fundamentalism. Unsuccessful. 1979-1980: JAMAICA. Financial pressure to destabilize government of Michael Manley, and campaign propaganda and demonstrations to defeat it in elections. Successful. 1979: AFGHANISTAN. Military aid to rebel forces of Zia Nezri, Zia Khan Nassry, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Sayed Ahmed Gailani and conservative mullahs to overthrow government of Hafizullah Amin. Aborted by Soviet intervention and installation of new government. 1980-1984: AFGHANISTAN. Continuing military aid to same rebel groups to harass Soviet occupation forces and challenge legitimacy of government of Babrak Karmal. 1979: SEYCHELLES. Destabilize government of France Albert Rene. Successful. 1980: GRENADA. Mercenary coup to overthrow government of Maurice Bishop. Successful. 1980: DOMINICA. Financial support to Freedom Party of Eugenia Charles to defeat Oliver Seraphim in Dominican elections. Successful. 1980: GUYANA. Assassinate opposition leader Walter Rodney to consolidate power of government of Forbes Burnham. Successful. 1980-1984: NICARAGUA. Military assistance to Adolfo Colero Portocarrero, Alfonso Robelo, Alfonso Callejas, Fernando Chamorro Rappacioli, Eden Pastora Gomez, Adrianna Guillen, Steadman Fagoth and former Somoza National Guard officers, to recruit, train and equip anti- Sandinista forces for sabotage and terrorist incursions into Nicaragua from sanctuaries in Honduras and Costa Rica, in effort to destabilize government of Daniel Ortega Saavedra. 1981: SEYCHELLES. Military coup to overthrow government of France Albert Rene. Unsuccessful. 1981-1982: MAURITIUS. Financial support to Seewoosagar Ramgoolam to bring him to power in 1982 elections. Unsuccessful. 1981-1984: LIBYA. Broad campaign of economic pressure, propaganda, military maneuvers in Egypt, Sudan and Gulf of Sidra, and organization if Libyan Liberation Front exiles to destabilize government of Muammar Qaddafi. Inconclusive. 1982: CHAD. Military assistance to Hissen Habre to overthrow government of Goukouni Oueddei. Successful. 1982: GUATEMALA. Military coup to overthrow government of Angel Anibal Guevara. Successful. 1982: BOLIVIA. Military coup to overthrow government of Celso Torrelio. Successful. 1982: JORDAN. Military assistance to equip and train two Jordanian brigades as an Arab strike force to implement United States policy objectives without Israeli assistance. 1982-1983: SURINAM. Overthrow government of Colonel Desi Bouterse. Three attempts in this period. Unsuccessful. 1984: EL SALVADOR. $1.4 million in financial support for the Presidential election campaign of Jose Napoleon Duarte. Successful.�Appendix II The Congo 1960: State Terrorism and Foreign Policy* A 1975 report of the Church Committee entitled "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders" provides a rare inside account of how such operations are planned and carried out--in this case, the CIA's attempt to assassinate Patrice Lumumba in the Congo in 1960. Lumumba, a popular politician considered pro-Soviet by U.S. policymakers, had briefly served as prime minister after the Congo gained its independence from Belgium in June of that year. According to the Senate report, "It is likely that President Eisenhower's...strong...concern about Lumumba...was taken by [CIA director] Allen Dulles as authority to assassinate Lumumba." CIA officials ordered a staff scientist (code- named "Joe") to prepare "toxic biological materials" that would "produce a disease...indigenous to that area [of Africa]" and to deliver the poison to the CIA station chief in Leopoldville, who was to assassinate Lumumba. But before the station chief could carry out his orders, Lumumba was captured by the forces of Joseph Mobutu, the U.S. supported nationalist leader who is still dictator of the country, and delivered to his archenemies in Katanga, where he was murdered. Following are excerpts from the cables, published by the committee, that were exchanged by CIA headquarters in Washington and the officers in the Congo. August 18, 1960. Station chief, Leopoldville, to CIA headquarters: EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING CLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT...DECISIVE PERIOD NOT FAR OFF. WHETHER OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYING COMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI- WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TO TAKE ACTION TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA. August 26. Headquarters to Leopoldville: IN HIGH QUARTERS HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF [LUMUMBA] CONTUNUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE RESULT WILL...AT WORST PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER...WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES..FOR THE INTERESTS OF *This excerpt appeared in Harper's Magazine in October 1984. THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY. CONSEQUENTLY WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE...OF OUR COVERT ACTION...TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE TO BE CONSULTED, YOU SHOULD SEEK HIS CONCURRENCE. IF IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE, HE DOES NOT WISH TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR AUTHORITY... September 19. Headquarters to Leopoldville, announcing the arrival of the poison: ["JOE"] SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX. 27 SEPT...WILL ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS "JOE FROM PARIS"...URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE ["JOE"] SOONEST...HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFY HIMSELF AMD EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGNMENT TO YOU. ALL CABLE TRAFFIC THIS OP...HOLD ENTIRELY TO YOURSELF. October 7. Leopoldville to headquarters: [JOE] LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING USEFULNESS. [STATION OFFICER] PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP. October 15. Headquarters to Leopoldville: POSSIBLE USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR ABDUCTIOM [LUMUMBA]...VIA ASSAULT ON HOUSE... October 17. Leopoldville to headquarters: NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENTOURAGE...RECOMMEND HQS POUCH SOONEST HIGH POWERED FOREIGN MAKE RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SCOPE AND SILENCER. HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHT IS RIGHT. November 14. Leopoldville to headquarters: TARGET HAS NOT LEFT BUILDING IN SEVERAL WEEKS. HOUSE GUARDED DAY AND NIGHT...TARGET HAS DISMISSED MOST OF SERVANTS SO ENTRY THIS MEANS SEEMS REMOTE. January 13. Fearing that Lumumba, who had been imprisoned by Mobutu's forces in December, would soon be freed by his supporters and seize power, Leopoldville cables headquarters: THE COMBINATION OF [LUMUMBA'S] POWERS AS DEMAGOGUE, HIS ABLE USE OF OF GOON SQUADS AND PROPAGANDA AND SPIRIT OF DEFEAT WITHIN [GOVERNMENT]...WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY INSURE [LUMUMBA] VICTORY IN PARLIAMENT...REFUSAL TAKE DRASTIC STEPS AT THIS TIME WILL LEAD TO DEFEAT OF [UNITED STATES] POLICY IN CONGO. January 17. Mobutu and his ally Joseph Kasavubu send Lumumba to his enemies in Katanga province, the forces of local leader Moise Tshombe. Two days later, the CIA base chief in Elizabethville cables headquarters: THANKS FOR PATRICE. IF WE HAD KNOWN HE WAS COMING WE WOULD HAVE BAKED A SNAKE. A U.N. inquiry later concluded Lumumba was killed by his enemies on or shortly after his arrival in Katanga. The Church Committee investigation found that "the toxic substances were never used. But there is, however, no suggestion of a connection between the assassination plot and the events which actually led to Lumumba's death". � [[Category:Conspiracies]] [[Category:Conspiracy BBS Archive]] [[Category: JFK]]
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